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COMMENTS
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS AND THE
MARITAL DEDUCTION
Under some circumstances the Internal Revenue Code allows a
marital deduction for estate tax purposes for an interest in property
which passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse.1 The interest
given must be included in determining the value of the decedent's
gross estate and must not be deductible under any other Code section. 3
The deduction is then allowed only to the extent of 50% of the adjusted
gross estate4 and only if the interest received by the surviving spouse
is not objectionable as a terminable interest.5 The Code provides sev-
eral exceptions to the terminable interest rule. Thus, if the surviving
spouse is entitled to all of the income from the property and in addi-
tion is given a power to appoint the property to herself or her estate
either by will or during life a marital deduction will be allowed, pro-
vided the power is exercisable by her alone and in all events.6 It is
the purpose of this paper to determine whether the interest given to
a surviving spouse by a joint or mutual will would qualify for the
marital deduction.
The terms "joint will" and "mutual will" have been used to de-
scribe several types of documents but as used in this paper they will
be given their most commonly accepted meaning. The term "joint will"
is used herein to describe two or more wills containing a common plan
of disposition. A joint and mutual will then is a single document ex-
ecuted as the will of two or more persons and containing a common
plan of disposition.7 Such a will is effective as a testamentary disposi-
tion of property if its provisions can be carried out separately, but the
will must be probated after the death of each testator.8 These three
types of wills in themselves raise no peculiar estate tax problems, but
very often such wills are based on a contract. It is, of course, possible
to have a joint or mutual will that is not based on a contract, but this
paper is concerned only with joint or mutual wills that are executed
pursuant to an enforceable contract. The contract will not be deter-
mined from the existence of a joint and mutual will alone, but very
little other evidence is needed. The will may expressly affirm or negate
the existence of a contract. In the absence of an expressed provision
a contract may be found from the phraseology or terms of the will.
I Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056. This section is applicable whether the husband
or the wife is the survivor, however in this paper it will be assumed that the
wife is the survivor unless the context indicates differently.
2Id. at §2056(a).3 Id. at §2056(c) (2) (A).
4Id. at §2056(c) (1).
5 Id. at §2056(b) (1).
61d. at §2056(b) (5).7 For other definitions see 27 WoRDs & PHRASES 961.
s 1 Page, Wills §107 (3d ed. 1941).
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In Doyle v. FisherO the husband provided for some of his children
while the wife provided for the others in their joint and mutual will.
This was all that was necessary for the court to determine that the
wills were executed pursuant to a contract."0 The will can be revoked
at any time even though it is executed pursuant to a contract (the con-
tract does not change the nature of a will) but after one of the parties
has died with the will in effect the survivor can no longer rescind the
contract. Sometimes it is said that the contract becomes irrevocable
only after the survivor has accepted the benefits of the will but most
of the cases involve situations in which the survivor actually has ac-
cepted the benefits of the will before an attempt to avoid the contract
is made, so the question is not squarely presented. This may be the
law in those jurisdictions where the wife cannot waive her right of
election while her husband is alive.1 There is dicta to the effect that
either party can rescind the contract while both are alive by giving
notice to the other,1 2 presumably because the other party can then
change his will and suffer no damages. In Wisconsin it is possible that
the parties cannot rescind the contract at any time after it is executed
because of the peculiar third party beneficiary rule,' 3 but no case has
ever decided the point.
The third party beneficiary can enforce the contract in equity 14 and
even if land is involved the statute of frauds is no bar because the first
party to die has fully performed his part of the contract. 5
I
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS BY WHICH THE FIRST
TO DIE GIVES A TERMINABLE INTEREST TO THE
SURVIVOR AND THE SURVIVOR GIVES ALL OF HIS
PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY.
Property Passing Under the Will:
Once it is determined that the will is based on a contract a ques-
tion arises as to the type of interest which passes to the survivor. If
the will gives the survivor a terminable interest, usually a life estate
with power to invade for support and comfort, no marital deduction
can be claimed for the property which passes under the will.' 6 The
problem then is to determine what property passes under the will.
9 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924).
10 In Doyle v. Fisher, Id., the court was dealing with a joint will. If the will is
not joint but merely mutual the contract must be proved by express language
on the face of the will. Wis. Stat. §238.19 (1957).
"1 See Shirley v. Shirley, 181 Tenn. 364, 181 S.W. 2d 346 (1944).
12 57 Am. Jur. Wills §706 (1948).
13 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903).
:4 Doyle v. Fisher, supra note 9.
15 Ibid.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056(b) (1). See also Federal Court cases cited at
note 47 infra.
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Property Not Passing Under the Will:
Joint tenancy property, to the extent that the consideration with
which it was purchased came from the decedent, is included in de-
termining the value of his gross estate' 7 and is considered to have
passed from the decedent for purposes of determining the marital
deduction.' s If the jointly owned property passes to the survivor under
the terms of the will her interest will be limited to a terminable interest
by the terms of the will and no marital deduction will be allowed-
Whether joint tenancy property passes under the will or not is deter-
mined by state property law and not the federal tax law.' 9
As a general rule, property held in joint tenancy passes by right
of survivorship which is the peculiar incident of an estate in joint
tenancy. The survivor takes his interest by purchase and not by suc-
cession.20 As a result of the right of survivorship, an attempted devise
or bequest of an interest in joint tenancy property is normally in-
effective. But the problem is complicated by a contractual will. A joint
tenancy can be severed by mutual agreement . 2 Thus, if the parties agree
that each will devise his interest in the joint property they have in
effect agreed that their rights in the property will be those of tenants
in common rather than joint tenants. This agreement is effective to
sever the joint tenancy, making the former joint tenants tenants in
common, 22 with the result that the undivided half interest of the first
to die will devolve by the terms of his will.
. If the agreement of the parties does not have the effect of severing
the joint tenancy the property may nevertheless pass under the will
by application of the doctrine of election. This doctrine is well ex-
pressed in Page on Wills.
A tenant in common, joint tenant or tenant by the entirety,
who devises the whole of such real estate to some one other than
the other tenant, and then gives to such other tenant other prop-
erty by will, puts such other to an election between retaining his
original interest in such real estate or accepting the benefits of
the will.23
If the testator intends to devise or bequeath only his undivided half
'7 Id. at §2040.
'R Id. at §2056(e) (5).
'1 See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
20 In re Will of Mechler, 246 Wis. 45, 16 N.W. 2d 373 (1944) ; Estate of Stayer,
218 Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935) ; Bassler v. Rewodinsld, 130 Wis. 26, 109
N.W. 1032 (1906) ; Echardt v. Osborne, 338 Ill. 611, 170 N.E. 744 (1930) ; 3
Am. L. Prop. §14.17, at 637 (1952); 14 AM. JUl. Cotenancy §6 (1938).2148 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy §4 (1947).
22 Berry v. Berry's Estate, 168 Kan. 253, 212 P. 2d 283 (1949); McDonald v.
Morley, 15 Cal. 2d 409, 101 P. 2d 690 (1940) ; 48 C.J.S. Joint tenancy §4 (1947);
129 A.L.R. 810 (1940).
23 4 PAGE, WILLS §vcER at 26-27 (3d ed. 1941). Quoted with approval in Will of
Schaech, 252 Wis. 299, at 305, 31 N.W. 2d 614 (1948).
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interest in the property the survivor is put to a similar election.24 This
doctrine becomes even more important in view of the fact that a sur-
viving joint tenant probably can not elect against a joint and mutual
will because of the contract obligation. In Estate of Charles Elson,25
the widow elected to take her statutory dower right, which was an
absolute interest, in lieu of the provisions made for her in a joint and
mutual will which she and her husband had executed pursuant to a
contract and which gave her a terminable interest. Her son, who was
the decedent's sole heir and beneficiary of the remainder interest in
the will, agreed to the widow's election. The court did not consider
itself bound by what was essentially a consent decree in the probate
court and held that the widow could not make any claim inconsistent
with the will after the death of her husband and disallowed the marital
deduction. A clause in the will giving either party the right to revoke
the will at any time was considered to be merely a restatement of the
case law that a joint and mutual will can be revoked at any time while
both parties are alive.
26
An interesting recent decision 27 in the Seventh Circuit involved a
will that apparently combined an agreement severing a joint tenancy
with the doctrine of election. A husband and wife executed a joint
and mutual will giving the survivor a life interest in real estate which
they owned in joint tenancy and devising the remainder interest to
their son. In construing the will the county court held that upon the
death of the wife the husband's joint tenancy interest changed to a
life estate with the remainder in the son. After the death of the hus-
band the U.S. District Court 2s was confronted with the problem of
determining what interest was includible in the husband's estate for
estate tax purposes. The court held that the joint and mutual will evi-
denced a contract severing the joint tenancy, and apparently that the
husband had elected to take the life estate in the wife's half interest
devised to him by the will and was therefore required to transfer the
remainder of his half interest in the property to the son, to whom the
wife's will attempted to devise it.2 9
24 Ibid. In Estate of Cobeen, 270 Wis. 545, 72 N.W. 2d 324 (1955) the language
of the will is not clearly restricted to a 2 interest but the court limited the
effect of the widow's election to 2 of the property.
2528 T.C. 442 (1957).
26 But see Shirley v. Shirley, supra note 11.
27 Olson v. Reisimer, 271 F. 2d 623 (7th Cir. 1959) overruling 170 F. Supp. 541
(E.D. Wis. 1959) on another point.
2s Ibid.
29 The county court decree said that the joint tenancy was severed at the time of
the wife's death. This may not be the law of Wisconsin. A severance of ajoint tenancy to be effective must occur during the lifetime of the joint ten-
ants. Bassler v. Rewodinski, supra note 20. No doubt the agreement could
be interpreted to have effected a severance during the life of the parties so the
decision is justified.
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If the joint tenancy property does pass to the surviving spouse by
right of survivorship rather than through the will the marital deduction
has been allowed even though the survivor's contract prohibits her from
changing her will. The contract obligation is said to be a restraint
which she voluntarily placed on her own property (the former joint
tenancy property) and does not limit her absolute interest to a termin-
able interest.30 A similar problem was presented in Lindsey v. U.S."'
The widow had contracted with her husband to convey to a trust to
be established in his will all of their entirety property, which she would
acquire in fee by right of survivorship at his death. The marital deduc-
tion was denied because of the restriction which the surviving spouse
had placed on her interest by her contract with her husband. The
decision gave effect to the "substance of the transactions rather than
their form.13 2 The contract in that case was somewhat different than
the contract involved in a joint and mutual will. Because the contract
required the wife to convey immediately after her husband's death,
there was no economic substance to the transaction whereas, in the
case of a contract to devise or bequeath whatever is left of the property
at death, the surviving spouse has a real economic interest in the prop-
erty. The Lindsey case was discussed in a subsequent case 33 involving
a joint and mutual will but the court thought that it was not in point.
In Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner3 4 after the court decided that the
survivor acquired the joint tenancy property by right of survivorship
and not by will the question remained as to whether or not the contract
aspects of their joint and mutual will limited the surviving spouse's
interest in the former joint tenancy property to a terminable interest.
The court held that the restraint was voluntarily placed on the property
by the surviving spouse and allowed the marital deduction.
II
A JOINT AND MUTUAL WILL BY WHICH THE FIRST
TO DIE GIVES AN ABSOLUTE INTEREST TO THE
SURVIVOR AND THE SURVIVOR GIVES ALL OF HER
PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY.
Property Not Passing Under the Will:
In determining whether a marital deduction should be allowed for
an interest in property which passes to the surviving spouse by right
of survivorship it should make no difference what interest the joint
and mutual will gives to her. The contract obligation is the same in
30 Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner, 221 F. 2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955); Estate of
Peterson v. Commissioner, 229 F. 2d 741 (8th Cir. 1955).
31 167 F. Supp. 136 (D. Md. 1958).
32 Id. at 138.
33 Schildmeier v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ind. 1959).
3' Supra note 30.
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any case. The Awtry35 case indicated that the contract was a restriction
voluntarily placed on her own property regardless of the terms of the
joint and mutual will, but indicated that the rule might be different
with regard to property which the survivor acquired through the will,
for as to that property the contract restraint attended the creation of
the estate. Several subsequent cases in which the survivor acquired
property through a joint and mutual will have ignored this distinction
and granted the marital deduction, citing the Awtry case as authority. 36
Property Passing Under the Will:
These cases usually hold that the survivor takes an absolute interest
under a joint and mutual will which purports to give the survivor a
fee,37 but the rights in the property seem somewhat less than absolute.
The label which the state property law puts on an interest in property
is not controlling in federal tax cases. There the inquiry is concerned
with the incidents of ownership which the surviving spouse has and
not the name which the state law gives to her collection of rights in
the property."
It is not clear just what interest the surviving spouse takes in the
property even though the will purports to give her a fee. She is still
bound by her contract to make a will. There is no general agreement
as to what interest a promissor has left in his property after contract-
ing to make a will. 9 Page on Wills" gives as a general rule that the
promissor can make gifts of the property if reasonable in amount and
not made to evade the contract. Some states seem to allow gifts as long
as they are made in good faith and make no mention of the reasonable-
ness of the amount. 41 Others allow the promissor to give all the property
away.42 In Texas it was held that the survivor of a contractual will
took a conditional fee, the condition of defeasance being that the sur-
vivor die seized of any of the property. His inter vivos gift of all of
the property to his second wife was valid even though he retained an
absolute life estate in it.43 But in Sample v. Butler University44 the
contract clearly provided that the survivor would devise real estate
which came to him by right of survivorship and which he owned at
35 Ibid.
36 Newman v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Ill. 1959); Schildmeier v.
United States, supra note 33.
37 Ibid.
38 See Helvering v. Stuart, supra note 19.
39 See Annot. 108 A.L.R. 867 (1937) for a collection of cases dealing with the
right of a party to a contractual joint and mutual will to dispose of property,
during life, and Sparks, Legal Effect of a Contract to Devise or Bequeath
Prior to the Death of the Promisor, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1954).
40 4 PAGE, WILLS, §1729, at 882 (3d ed. 1941).
41 Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 269 N.W. 883 (1936).
42 Harrell v. Hickman, 147 Tex. 396, 215 S.W. 2d 876 (1948).
43 Ibid.
44 211 Ind. 122, 4 N.E. 2d 545 (1936), modified 211 Ind. 139, 5 N.E. 2d 888 (1937).
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the time of his death. He gave all the real estate away during his life
and owned nothing at death for the will to operate on. The court
allowed the remaindermen to recover the property because the gift
defeated the purpose of the contract even though the survivor complied
with the letter of the contract.
If the survivor can give away property only if reasonable in
amount or only if not done for the purpose of avoiding the contract
she certainly does not have a sufficient power of appointment to bring
her within the exception to the terminable interest rule.45 But even if
the surviving spouse can make gifts of the entire property during her
life her interest is still limited in that she can not dispose of it by
will to anyone she wishes, which is one of the rights of absolute owner-
ship. In most jurisdictions the ultimate taker acquires his interest
through the wife's will so she does dispose of the property testimentarily
in a technical sense but only in a manner which the contract allows.40
It cannot be said as to property which she has received through the
joint or mutual will that she has voluntarily given up the right of
testimentary disposition for over that property she never had such
a right.
INTEREST PASSING UNDER CONTRACTUAL WILL AS EQUIVALENT
To LIFE ESTATE WITH UNLIMITED POWER TO INVADE:
If the surviving spouse can make lifetime gifts of the entire prop-
erty, then what she was given by the will and received as consideration
in the contract was the right to do what she would with the property
except dispose of it by intestacy or will, except in a manner prescribed
by the contract. That is the substance of her estate if not the form.
The interest which the surviving spouse has in such a case is equiva-
lent to a life estate with an unlimited power to invade. This is some-
thing different than a power to use or consume; if the power is un-
limited the surviving spouse can make gifts and thus dissipate the
whole estate during her life, while a power to consume gives the sur-
vivor only the right to use the property herself. 47 The holder of a life
estate with an unlimited power to invade and one who holds an estate
under a joint or mutual will, which under local law does not restrict
her right to make gifts, have the same rights to deal with the property.
They can both use the property or make gifts out of it, but in both -
instances the devolution of the property is determined at the time of
45 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056(b) (5).46 This would seem to be the rule since the will must be probated after the death
of each of the parties who signed the will. 57 Am. JuR., Wills §682 (1948).
47 Will of Zweifel, 194 Wis. 428, 216 N.W. 840 (1927) ; Estate of Cobeen, supra
note 24. For examples of wills that have been construed to give the survivor
only a limited right to invade see, In re Tarver's Estate 255 F. 2d 913 (4th
Cir. 1958) ; Dexter v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1958) ; Matte-
son v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Estate
of Ellis, 252 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
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the creation of the estate. The technical property law differs of course.
If the property is held by virtue of a joint and mutual will the ultimate
taker gets title by virtue of the survivor's will in most jurisdictions 4 S
whereas the ultimate taker of property held in a life estate with an
unlimited power to invade gets his title through the deceased spouse's
will. The only practical difference that this makes is that the latter
prevents lapse. Another possible difference between the two is that in
the former the wife has agreed to the ultimate taker by her contract
while in the latter she has not. However, neither of these differences
affects the substance of the survivor's interest in the property, and the
tax laws are more interested in the substance than the form.49
WHETHER THE MARITAL DEDUCTION is ALLOWED FOR
LIFE ESTATE WITH UNLIMITED POWER TO INVADE:
If the widow's interest is equivalent to a life estate with an un-
limited power to invade it is questionable whether the marital deduc-
tion will be allowed. A deduction for such an estate was denied in
Pipe's Estate v. C.I.R. ° In that case the surviving spouse had the right
to use and dispose of the property during her life, including the right
to give the property away. If any property were sold, under the local
law the traceable proceeds were held the same as the original property.
At the death of the surviving spouse all that was left of the property
was to go to legatees named in the deceased spouse's will. The case was
decided under the 1939 Code which allowed a deduction for an equiva-
lent power over property held in trust.5 This was considered a trust
under New York law, but the court decided that if an unrestricted
power to invade were equivalent to a power to appoint it would not in
any event bring the estate within the exception to the terminable inter-
est rule. The court reasoned that if this were a regular trust the sur-
viving spouse could appoint to herself free of the trust and thus make
the property subject to her will. But with the interest that the surviving
wife was given under her deceased husband's will there was no possi-
bility of disposing of the property by her will even though it was con-
sidered a trust under local property law.
The 1954 Code removed the requirement of a trust,52 but the Code
still requires that the surviving spouse have the power to appoint "in
favor of such surviving spouse, or the estate of such surviving spouse,
or in favor of either .... -. 3 The power may be exercisable during life or
4s See note 46 supra.
49 Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 310 U.S.
637 (1940).
5o 241 F. 2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming 23 T. C. 99.
51 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §812(e).
52 §2056(b) (5) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 replaced §812(e) of the 1939 Code.
53 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2056(b) (5) (B).
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by will., 4 But as the court pointed out in Pipe's Estate, if the surviving
spouse is given an unlimited power to invade and a limitation over of
all that remains at her death is added, the extent of her interest in the
property will depend on whether the property is in trust or not. If the
property is in trust she can invade the trust, and thus having made
the property her own she can dispose of it by will. Whereas, if the
property is held by her directly there is no way for her to defeat the
gift over. Even if it is in some way possible for her to make a gift to
herself of what she already has, the limitation would still be effective
since she would own the property at her death. All that is left to
appoint is the remainder. When the surviving spouse exercises her
power to invade a life estate by making a gift she in effect appoints
the remainder interest as well as her present interest but the appoint-
ment is to another, not to herself or her estate as the Code requires.
Perhaps this is a technical distinction, but it is not devoid of practical
significance, and since tax deductions are a matter of legislative grace,
one who claims a deduction must bring himself clearly within the
terms of the statute.55
This quesiton was before the Fifth Circuit in M1,/cGehee v. Com-
missioner. 5 The interest given to the surviving spouse was the same
as that given in Pipe's Estate. The deduction was denied in the original
opinion which was decided under the 1939 Code for the reason that
the property was not in trust. Rehearing was granted after the enact-
ment of the Technical Amendments Act of 195857 which changed the
marital deduction requirements of the 1939 Code to the substantial
equivalent of the 1954 Code. The court then granted the marital de-
duction, simply stating that it was no longer necessary for the property
to be in trust, and did not consider the extent of the power. The extent
of the power was not objected to in the original decision. The only
objection was the obvious one that the property was not in trust as
the Code then required. But as has been shown above, an unlimited
power to invade property held in a life estate with a limitation over
is not as extensive as the same power over property held in trust.
The House Committee Report accompanying the 1954 Code indi-
cates the intention of Congress. The report states that:
• . . present law requires in such cases that the property be
placed in "trust" and because of doubt under the law of the
various States as to what constitutes a "trust" it is not clear
when a legal life estate will qualify as a "trust." ...
The bill makes it clear that property in a legal life estate
54 72 C.J.S. Powers §49 (1951).
55 New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
56 260 F. 2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
57 P.L. 85-866, 85th Cong. 72 Stat. 1668 §93 (1958).
19601
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
as well as property in trust qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion .... 5
For example, under the new provisions a transfer to the
spouse of a legal life estate with an unlimited power to invade
would qualify for the marital deduction if all the other pro-
visions of this section are met. (Emphases added.) 59
One of the "other provisions of this section" is that the surviving
spouse have the power to appoint to herself or her estate, which it
seems cannot be done by one having just an unlimited power to invade
a life estate with a limitation over. It seems that the committee was
merely pointing out that a life estate will qualify under the new Code
as well as a trust if the proper powers are given. A life estate with
an unlimited power to invade and with a power to appoint by will with
a limitation over if the power is not exercised would no doubt qualify
under this section because the surviving spouse could then appoint to
her estate even though she could not appoint to herself.60
The reason given in the Report for changing the law does not
indicate an intention of Congress to grant the marital deduction for
any lesser interest in property than the previous law allowed, but only
to avoid the necessity of determining whether the property over which
the surviving spouse has the required power is considered to be in
trust under local law.
III
CONCLUSION
A marital deduction may be allowed for an interest in joint tenancy
property which passes by right of survivorship regardless of the terms
of a joint and mutual will. However, if the contractual aspects of the
will are interrupted to effect a severance of the joint tenancy one half
of the former joint tenancy property will pass under the will. If a
severance is not effected, half. or all of the joint tenancy property may
still pass under the will by application of the doctrine of election.
In either event the right to a marital deduction will depend on
whether the will gives an absolute or a terminable interest to the sur-
vivor. As has been shown above, it is doubtful that a mere right to
use and consume or even to dispose of the property during life will
be considered an absolute interest.
It may be that the McGeheec' decision will be followed in other
circuits, but Pipe's Estate62 is still applicable under the new Code and
could very easily be applied to an estate limited by a joint or mutual
58 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess.
59 Ibid.
60 There may be a question as to the validity of the limitation over, under local
property law. See Will of Zweifel 194 Wis. 428, 216 N.W. 840 (1927). But see
Estate of Holmes, 233 Wis. 274, 289 N.W. 638 (1940).
61 Supra note 56.
62Supra note 50.
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will. This, along with the caveat in Awtry's Appeal3 that the marital
deduction may not be allowed as to property which passes under a
joint or mutual will raises some doubt as to the advisability of using
a joint or mutual will for an estate large enough to make the federal
estate tax a consideration. In order to qualify for the marital deduction
the power given to the surviving spouse must be so extensive that the
contractual aspects of a joint or mutual will are almost a nullity. This
is in accord with the original intention of Congress in allowing the
marital deduction, i.e., to equalize the application of the estate tax in
community property and common law States.6 4 In community property
states the deceased spouse can not limit his surviving spouse's power
over her share of the community property 5 and the marital deduction
was intended to be allowed for a substantially equivalent interest in
property given to a surviving spouse in common law States.6"
THOMAS FINCH
63 Supra note 30.
64 S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; See also Pitts v. Hamrick, 228
F. 2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
6-5 I PAGE, WILLS §203 (3d ed. 1941).
66 See note 64 supra.
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